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In the last few decades of our history, strong sentiments of anti-intellectualism and 
distrust in scientific authority have developed and spread throughout American society. 
Recently, the outward displays of denial and distrust surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic and 
climate change have demonstrated just how pervasive these views are becoming. This study 
looked at public opinion on a variety of anti-intellectual views among the American public. The 
main question this research was attempting to answer is what are the political and social 
correlates of anti-intellectualism? The data I used to test this question was the 2021 Chapman 
University Survey on American Fears. I looked specifically at questions within the survey that 
address public stances on climate change, vaccinations, and mask wearing (during the COVID-
19 pandemic) along with the demographic characteristics of each response group. After running 
a variety of tests for each question to check for any correlations between the level of fear 
expressed and demographics, I found support for which social and political categories are more 
likely to subscribe to anti-intellectual beliefs like climate change denial, anti-vax, and anti-










Historian Richard Hofstadter first popularized the term anti-intellectualism in his 1964 
work Anti-Intellectualism in American Life. According to him, anti-intellectual beliefs could be 
defined as “a resentment and suspicion of the life of the mind and of those who are considered 
to represent it; and a disposition constantly to minimize the value of that life” (Hofstadter, 
1964, p. 7). Back in the 1950’s it was McCarthyism which targeted intellectuals, among other 
groups of people, and planted the seed of fear among the American public manufacturing this 
distrust and resentment Hofstadter was observing (1962, p. 3). Since then, this seed has grown 
and entangled itself throughout U.S. public opinion and political life, propagated by political 
leaders and institutions that “[embrace] anti-intellectualism for political benefit” (Shogan, 2007, 
295).  One policy area has been highly impacted by this sentiment of anti-intellectualism than 
that of climate change. While the international scientific community have been in consensus on 
the reality and severity of the global climate change crisis for years, the topic has remained up 
for debate in American politics and society to this day.  
If the United States has any chance of effectively responding to current climate threats, 
we must first understand why climate denialism has persisted this long. The concepts 
presented in this literature review will analyze public opinion on climate change within the 
United States historically and presently with the purpose of answering the question why do 
some American citizens deny the existence climate change and distrust climate scientists? 
Through the evaluation of multiple scholarly articles, themes of party polarization, elite cues, 
and demographics will be identified and addressed as influential factors towards climate 
change opinion and belief. The analysis will highlight similarities between and support across 
these several articles to draw a general picture of how the growing polarization among political 
elites, the subsequent cues the give to the public electorate, and demographics have played a 
major role in influencing U.S. opinion on climate change. Additionally, I will broaden this 
conversation to look at general trends of trust in science over time and if these factors 
influencing climate change denial are also influencing present-day issues such as vaccinations 
and most recently, the COVID-19 pandemic.  
Polarization 
The increased ideological polarization of the Democratic and Republican parties within 
the United States has played a significant role in influencing public trust in science, and more 
specifically public opinion on climate change. Diverging partisan views became more 
pronounced after the onset of the Republican Revolution which made congressional and 
partisan “disagreements in the 1990’s and early 2000’s more pronounced and more intense 
than they used to be” (Stonecash et al., 2018, p.1). Multiple studies have looked at public 
opinion over the course of this time period and concluded that polarization levels among the 
public on certain issues appeared to reflect the levels of polarization between the political 
parties themselves. 
As Dunlap and McCright point out, support for environmental protection policies and 
initiatives has historically “been relatively nonpartisan” (2008, p.1). They specifically site 
conservation efforts by both of the Roosevelt presidents as well as the bipartisan during the 
Nixon years and important environmental acts in the 1970’s as testaments to this previously 
nonpartisan nature of environmental views (Dunlap & McCright, 2008, p.1). A noticeable shift 
occurred in public opinion in the mid 1990’s though. Through their analysis of public opinion 
polls from 1997 to 2008 Dunlap and McCright conclude that the correlation between public 
views on global warming and party affiliation has increased over time (2008, p.5). The authors 
argue that the observed increase in correlation levels support the assertion of party sorting, or 
the idea that groups of the population often separate themselves along party lines which in 
turn “heighten their partisan differences” (Dunlap & McCright, 2008, p.5). Specific trends they 
noticed were a decline in proportion of Republicans who believe the effects of global warming 
are currently taking place, as well as an increased proportion of Republicans that view the 
seriousness of warming to be exaggerated (Dunlap & McCright, 2008, p.4). 
Another study conducted by Egan and Mullin measures the influence of different factors 
on climate change opinions, namely those of demographics, risk perceptions, personal 
experiences or vulnerabilities, and polarization. While the first three factors have a noticeable 
impact on individual climate change beliefs, their research argued that “partisan polarization” 
plays a much more dominant role in influencing aggregate opinions (Egan & Mullin, 2017, 
p.216). Like Dunlap and McCright, they cite the 1990’s as a turning point for climate change 
opinion which initiated the “gap between partisans that has widened over time and currently 
stands at more than 40 percentage points” (Egan & Mullin, 2017, p.218). These findings support 
Dunlap and McCright’s claims that there is a noticeable “pattern of divergent partisan views” 
between Republicans and Democrats when it comes to global warming beliefs (2008, p.4). 
Through their research they had concluded that U.S. public opinion on climate change reflected 
the “deeply polarized” and “deadlocked” nature of the country’s political structure at large 
(Egan and Mullin, 2017, p. 210). 
Gauchat takes a step back to look at the more generalized topic of public trust in science 
over a longer period of time, from 1974 through to 2010 (2012, p.167). Although his research 
did not focus on climate change specifically, he observed a similar pattern of party 
polarization’s influence on public opinion in regard to trust in science over time. Looking at 
“individuals’ trust in science” can actually be a determining factor is one’s opinion on climate 
change according to Egan and Mullin, which is why Gauchat’s research can be influential in this 
conversation (2017, p.207).  The main conclusion he made from his research was that “public 
trust in science has not declined since the 1970s except among conservatives and those who 
frequently attend church” (Gauchat, 2012, p.182). Gauchat found support specifically for that 
of the politicization thesis which “predicts that ideological conservatives will experience group-
specific declines in trust in science over time’ (2012, p.171). Just like the previously mentioned 
studies identified a decline in Republicans’ belief in certain global warming realities, Gauchat’s 
findings demonstrate that declining trust in science was most noticeable among conservatives 
as well.  
Political Elite Cues 
Several studies have found this previously discussed polarization between parties is 
most prominent within the ranks of the political elite, or those in positions of political power in 
the United States like members of Congress or President (Dunlap & McCright, 2008, p.1). Not 
only are elite views highly polarized, but due to the powerful positions they hold in society, they 
are highly influential over public opinion and mass attitudes. This “top-down” influence over 
public opinion allows elites to provide signaling cues to the public which positions they should 
be taking on relevant issues (Dunlap & McCright, 2008, p.5). Dunlap and McCright concede that 
not all analysts are in agreement that political polarization is driven by the elite in a top-down 
manner. They cite the research of Geoffrey Layman who sees this discussion as similar to the 
chicken and the egg debate, where one cannot truly determine which came first (Dunlap & 
McCright, 2008, p.4). Despite this, they claim that a majority of research appears to support 
their view of elite driven polarization which will be demonstrated below. 
While Egan and Mullin named polarization as the dominant influence of climate change 
opinion, their research looked a little further into explanations as to why this is the case. 
Through their research, they found that the complex and abstract nature of climate change 
science and policy “can make it difficult for individuals to form their own judgments about 
[their] accuracy” (2017, pg.217). Because of this, many people are inclined to rely on and look 
to partisan elites for this information instead (Egan & Mullin, 2017, pg.217). After looking at 
data collected from the American National Election Studies (ANES) and other surveys from 1988 
to 2012, they found support for the concept of issue evolution or the theory that “attitudes 
among partisans in the electorate have come to mirror the divided positions taken by partisans 
in government” (Egan and Mullin, 2017, p. 219). Egan and Mullin’s observations of issue 
evolution were divergent from the previous period in the 1970’s where public opinion on 
environmental issues was actually resistant to diverging views among elites (2017, p. 219). By 
the 1990’s it appeared as though the electorate had caught up to this elite divide and this 
division “proceeded to grow in a dramatic fashion” (Egan and Mullin, 2017, p. 219). While they 
acknowledge the large role politicization plays in public opinion, Egan and Mullin ultimately 
conclude ques given by the political elite are the main drivers of politicization and ultimately 
affect public stances on political issues.  
A different study conducted by Brulle, Carmichael, and Jenkins examined a wide range 
of factors influencing climate change concern and concurred with Egan and Mullin that elite 
cues are influential. In fact, when looking at five categories of “extreme weather events, public 
access to accurate scientific information, media coverage, elite cues, and movement/ 
countermovement advocacy” elite cues had one of the largest effects on public concern levels 
(Brulle et al., 2012). Their research involved constructing a Climate Change Threat Index (CCTI) 
to help measure levels of concern among the surveyed public (Brulle et al., 2012). After 
collecting the data, Brulle and his colleagues were able to conclude that within the category of 
elite cues “the two strongest effects on public concern are Democratic Congressional action 
statements and Republican roll-call votes, which increase and diminish public concern, 
respectively” (Brulle et al., 2012). Their research supported the view that political elites are 
critical factors when it comes to influencing and even shifting concern about climate change 
among the public.  
Demographics 
Many of the previous studies, in their analysis of data, have measured the impact of a 
variety of demographic characteristics on public opinion. These demographics can include 
categories like gender, race, age, and religion to name a few. Unlike the clear association 
identified between elite cues, party polarization, and public attitudes on climate change, 
researchers have come to a variety of conclusions when it comes to the influence of 
demographics. One of the four factors that Egan and Mullin looked into for their research was 
demographics, which they claim “[accounts] for surprisingly little of the variation in how people 
perceive this problem” of climate change (2017, p.215). While they recognize the greater 
influence of religiosity and gender in particular, the “findings for other personal characteristics 
that are often associated with policy attitudes—race, age, education, and income—are mixed” 
(Egan & Mullin, 2017, p.215). They argue that a potential reasoning behind this limited effect if 
demographics when it comes public opinion is that the impacts of climate change are more 
widespread and do not impact one population exclusively (Egan & Mullin, 2017, p.214). I would 
argue that this viewpoint, or at least the viewpoint concluded from their research, neglects the 
disproportionate impacts of environmental issues like climate change on minority communities 
both domestically and internationally.  
McCright and Dunlap also looked more specifically into the demographics of climate 
change denial. This research wanted to test the hypothesis of “whether conservative white 
males are more likely than are other adults in the U.S. general public to endorse climate change 
denial” (McCright & Dunlap, 2011, p.1163). If this hypothesis is supported by the data, it would 
be challenging Egan and Mullin’s claim that demographics are not as influential in determining 
public perceptions of climate change. McCright and Dunlap collected their data from 
environmental polls over the course of nine years from 2001-2010 and hoped to explore “the 
intersection of political ideology, race, and gender” (McCright & Dunlap, 2011, p.1164). Their 
data analysis revealed that “political conservatives and males are more likely to report a climate 
change denial view than are their politically liberal and female counterparts” (McCright & 
Dunlap, 2011, p.1169). This finding demonstrates that demographic factors like gender in 
addition to political identification can influence anti-intellectual views about climate change. 
Even Egan and Mullin support this when citing that “that women express higher levels of belief 
and concern about the problem than men do” (2017, p.215).  
Another demographic category that both of these studies considered to be of note is 
religiosity. Egan and Mullin expressed that religiosity, along with gender, are two demographics 
that can influence with climate change attitudes (2017, p.215). McCright and Dunlap found that 
“more religious individuals […] are still more likely to report denialist beliefs than are their 
respective counterparts” as well (2011, p.1171). Likewise, Gauchat’s data demonstrated how 
“those who attended church frequently experienced group-specific change over time” (2012, 
p.179). All three of these studies appear to support the larger influence of party polarization, 
gender, and religiosity in influencing U.S. public opinion on climate change, helping to shape a 
better picture of why certain sects of the population hold denialist views. Something interesting 
when looking at the data collection from these studies, is that some of them did not include age 
as influential of a demographic attribute.  
Vaccinations  
Research has shown anti-intellectual views towards climate change are largely 
influenced by demographics, elite cues, and partisanship but do these factors also influence 
views towards other policy areas like vaccinations? In recent years there has been an observed 
increase in anti-vaccination viewpoints which pose a threat to public health and safety and 
should be addressed as well. One study conducted by Marian Olpinski looked specifically into 
the history of the anti-vaccination movement within the United States and cites the airing of a 
television program in the early 1980’s as its initiation (2012). The program was called “DPT: 
Vaccine Roulette” and linked this particular vaccine to brain damage and incited mass fear 
among parents who soon began refusing to vaccinate their children out of fear (Olpinski, 2012). 
Another event characterized as even more influential was an article published in the 1998 by 
Andrew Wakefield which suggested that there was a connection between MMR vaccines and 
autism diagnoses, and we can see how influential this writing was for there still exists concern 
over the potential link between the two (Olpinski, 2012). 
A recent study published in 2018 explained how Wakefield’s study helped the revival of 
anti-vaccination sentiment in Western countries like the United States (Hussain et al.). Despite 
the fact that his claims were later disproven by multiple other studies, the initial publicity his 
work received perpetuated these ideas and fears into the minds of the public and resulted in 
negative consequences down the line (Hussain et al., 2018). In the fallout of his research there 
was an observable decline in the percent of parents who were allowing to receive the MMR 
vaccines which protect against diseases like measles, which had previously believed to have 
been eradicated the United States (Hussain et al., 2018). With lowered vaccinations rates, there 
has been recent measles outbreaks began occurring throughout Western countries that 
threaten public health and previously established herd immunity (Hussain et al., 2018).  
Looking more specifically at the factors that may influence an individual’s likelihood to 
be distrusting of vaccines there has been some empirical support for impact of partisanship. 
One study published in 2015 analyzed the political and social factors that determined vaccine 
hesitancy during the swine flu outbreak and found strong support for the influence of 
partisanship (Mesch & Schwirian, 2015). They concluded that “political partisanship had a 
significant effect on the willingness to become vaccinated” with Democrats being more willing 
than their Republican or Independent counterparts (Mesch & Schwirian, 2015). From their data 
they found 39.6% of Democrats expressed willingness to get the H1N1 vaccination while only 
32.2% of Republicans were willing (Mesch & Schwirian, 2015). This difference between levels of 
hesitancy towards vaccines depending on party supports the influential effect of party politics 
on public attitudes. There is still much more research that needs to be conducted in order to 
fully support the effects of partisanship on vaccine beliefs for this was one of the few studies 
that looked specifically at the interaction between politics and vaccinations.  
The other two factors discussed previously were demographics and elite cues, and there 
has been minimal research linking these factors to vaccine beliefs. In terms of demographics 
studies have concluded parents are the individuals who are more fearful of vaccinations as of 
recent, since Wakefield’s work linked the MMR vaccine to autism in children (Hussain et al., 
2018). Pediatricians and doctors have been seeing an elevated number of parents who are 
refusing to have their children vaccinated when coming in for appointments, which has in turn 
been leading to the outbreaks of older diseases as mentioned before (Olpinski, 2012). Studies 
also mention the fact that misinformation spread by social media, celebrity figures, and 
politicians alike has played a large role in the propagation of these myths surrounding the 
dangers of vaccines hinting at the possibility of elite cues influencing vaccine belief as well. 
Celebrities like Jenny McCarthy have also perpetuated the anti-vaccination movement by using 
their platforms to spread fear and misinformation (Hussain et al., 2018). There have been 
specific anti-vaccination websites created to spread misinformation surrounding their 
effectiveness and safety which reach large segments of the public due to high levels of internet 
access in the United States (Olpinski, 2012).  
While research has shown that parents have a tendency to hold anti-intellectual views 
surrounding vaccines and some instances of celebrity influence, there is still minimal 
information available about the effects of demographics and elite cues on vaccination attitudes. 
This missing information is all the more relevant today with the arrival of the coronavirus in the 
United States which has deepened some of the political divides in this country among 
politicians and the public alike. COVID-19 has become so politicized that policies recommended 
by scientific professional and organization like mask wearing, social distancing, and vaccinations 
have become a topic of debate and contention, highlighting this persistent and growing distrust 
in scientific authority. I believe more research must be conducted in light of today’s issues to 
have a better understanding of how social and political correlates have been influencing these 
anti-intellectual behaviors. 
Purpose 
Overall, the analysis of U.S. public opinion on climate change and what factors influence 
and shift it is necessary to understand why certain sects of the population maintain denialist 
views. Through the review of scholarly articles, it has been demonstrated that elite-driven 
polarization between the Democrat and Republican political parties, that has increased over 
time, is one of the main determinates of climate views held by the public. The wider reach of 
anti-intellectualism has been discussed by looking at public attitudes towards more recent 
topics like vaccination of children and coronavirus policies. Understanding what influences 
these denialist views helps one understand what must be challenged and changed within the 
United States political system in order to effectively and efficiently address the climate crisis 
and the coronavirus pandemic. Another factor impacting public opinion that has been identified 
is demographics. Although some debate has been seen throughout research, certain 
demographic characteristics has been recognized across research as particularly influential on 
individual climate change beliefs. This review began by acknowledging the growth of anti-
intellectualism within the country over time and demonstrated which social and political factors 
have allowed this sentiment to prosper here answering the question of why some Americans 
deny the existence of climate change.  
The purpose of this present study is to examine the demographic and political correlates 
of anti-intellectualism in the United States as they relate to present day policy issues including 
climate change, vaccinations, and COVID-19. These topics are areas in which there is clear 
scientific consensus which have implications for public health, which is why they should be of 
particular interest to the government. In order to have effective policy responses to crises we 
need to be working towards reestablishing trust between the American people and figures of 
scientific authority. I hope to help achieve this by shedding light on who exactly is holding anti-














The data used for this study was collected from the Chapman University Survey on 
America Fears (CSAF). This survey was collected through the SRSS online opinion panel and was 
administered over the course of ten days from January 5th-15th 2021. While the survey was 
completed by 1,067 participants, the final sample of participants used for the data set consisted 
of 1,035 adults 18 years and older. This number was tapered down using a quality checking 
system that ultimately removed several responses that did not pass standards. It is important 
to note that while Chapman University is located in Southern California, the survey was 
conducted on a national scale and therefore results are more representative of the country at 
large. Researchers implemented a weighting system to ensure the data provided “nationally 
representative and projectable estimates” (Rapoport, Berta, & Kline, 2021). The weighting 
process involved multiple stages including calculating a base weight to determine survey 
recruitment probabilities, accounting for households which lack internet access for an online 
survey and sorting demographic samples to reflect “population parameters” (Rapoport, Berta, 
and Kline, 2021). 
Materials 
This study attempted to look at levels of anti-intellectualism among the American 
public, but there is no universal measurement for this phenomenon. Using the Survey on 
American Fears, I selected several questions from the survey that ask about levels of fear 
towards topics of scientific consensus with political implications. Since anti-intellectualism 
involves a general distrust of science and scientific authority, these questions are used as a 
proxy to measure trust in science. The three specific categories of anti-intellectual beliefs that 
were looked at and measured during this study were views on climate change and global 
warming, health and safety responses during the COVID-19 pandemic, and vaccinations.  
The question reading read “How afraid are you of the following: Global warming and 
climate change?” was selected as the best proxy for measuring public opinion towards climate 
change. The original data from the survey for this question was measured on a scale ranging 
from “very afraid” to “not afraid”, but this question was recoded into a binary variable to allow 
for easier interpretation of results after testing. This resulted in two binary options of either 
afraid or not afraid of climate change. With the scientific community being in consensus on the 
reality and threat of climate change for decades, the analysis of this question relied on the 
assumption that those who are trusting of science would hold some level of fear towards it. It 
was assumed that those who do not believe in something, would not be afraid of it.  
The second category of anti-intellectual beliefs involved the recent COVID-19 pandemic. 
As with climate change, I used the following questions as proxies for measuring anti-
intellectualism and trust in science since the information surrounding the pandemic and 
response measures have been communicated by scientific officials and organizations. The first 
asked the following: “How afraid are you of the following: A loved one contracting the 
coronavirus (COVID-19)?”. While I initially planned on using question asking how afraid 
individuals were of contracting COVID-19 themselves, I decided that this one would be a better 
measurement to determine levels of trust in science. The second question that addressed the 
pandemic stated “Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements about 
the coronavirus (COVID-19). The benefits of wearing a mask outweigh the consequences of not 
wearing one”. Both of these questions were also recoded into binary variables to help make 
interpretation easier.  
Lastly, several questions from the Survey on American Fears addressed public attitudes 
towards vaccinations, another area of contention for those who hold anti-intellectual beliefs. 
The first question used for this category asked “Please indicate your level of agreement with 
the following statements about the coronavirus (COVID-19). When a safe and effective 
coronavirus (COVID-19) vaccine becomes available, I will get it as soon as possible”. I recognized 
that the COVID vaccine in particular has become highly politicized, so I also wanted to include 
questions that revealed public stances towards vaccines in general outside of the context of the 
pandemic. Two other questions addressing general attitudes towards vaccinates helped paint a 
more accurate picture of attitudes towards vaccines and scientific consensus. These three 
questions were all recoded into binary varaibles as well. 
Procedure 
As mentioned previously, data for the survey was collected over a period of 10 days 
beginning with a “soft launch” on January 5th, 2021. This soft launch involved sending out the 
online survey to a smaller number of individuals to ensure the data collection was working as 
expected. Once this proved successful, the survey was sent out to a larger population of 
potential participants totaling 2,019. In order to incentivize participation, electronic gift cards 
were sent out to participants who completed the survey in its entirety, and there was a 51% 
percent completion rate. Since the polling was completed online it was self-administered by the 
participants and margins of error were calculated and accounted for once all the data was 
collected.  
The questionnaire had a minimum of 36 question sections with multiple parts for each 
one. For my study I chose to focus specifically on the six questions detailed in the last section 
that relate to my research question of the political and social correlates of anti-intellectualism. 
Additionally, I went in and selected the political and social demographics I was interested in 
testing in relation to them. I looked at five categories of political ideology, political party, 
religiosity, gender, and race and recoded these inputs to function as my independent variables. 
I then was able to run tests and analyze relationships between public views towards the 
questions about climate change, COVID-19, and vaccines and their demographic spread. 
For my research I created three main hypotheses, and one related hypothesis, to test 
using the recoded questions and data from the Survey on American Fears.  
 
Main Hypotheses: 
H1: Conservative, white, men make are more likely to deny climate change than other 
demographic groups 
H2: Women are more likely to be fearful/distrusting of vaccinations than men 
H3: Due to heightened polarization, political party affiliation is a significant predictor of 
anti-intellectual views 
Related Hypothesis:  




The first hypothesis tests whether the characterization of climate change deniers as 
predominately conservative, white, men by researchers like Egan and Mullin was supported by 
this data. My second hypothesis speculated that women over men would be more distrusting in 
vaccines since much of the anti-vaccination rhetoric I have observed in my life has been shared 
by women. The third main hypothesis is based off of research supporting the increasingly 
polarized nature of our political system, and how that politicization informs public views 
through elite cues. I hypothesized that one’s political party would be one of the biggest factors 
in determining if they held anti-intellectual views. My fourth hypothesis predicted that due to 
the history of medical violence people of color have experienced in the United States, they 
would likely be more fearful of receiving vaccinations. This last hypothesis differs from the 
previous three because it does not necessarily signal an increased level of anti-intellectualism, 
but rather the generational trauma that has informed attitudes of people of color today. For 
this reason, I consider it to be a related hypothesis. 
 
RESULTS 
To test these hypotheses, I started out by running a series of crosstabulations between 
each dependent variable and independent variable and looked more specifically at 
subcategories within each demographic group. For example, within the independent variable 
group of political ideology I obtained unique percentages for liberals, moderates, and 
conservatives to better understand how exactly one’s political ideology influences their views 
on climate change, COVID-19, and vaccinations. After all of the crosstab tests were complete, I 
arranged the data in a percentage table allowing me to analyze these results and see if I could 
decipher any general patterns or distributions that would be of note (Table 1).  
 
Most of the data came out as one would expect. For example, fears towards highly 
politicized issues like climate change were more common among liberals and Democrats over 
conservatives and republicans with around 95% of former expressing fear towards climate 
change while that number dropped around 40% for the later (Table 1). One area that was 
somewhat was surprising when initially running the data was the relatively high level of concern 
about the safety of vaccines expressed across all demographic groups, there appeared to be 
smaller gaps between demographic groups when it came to this subject.  While the percentage 
table is helpful in understanding the spread of my data along with any general trends that 
emerged, the crosstab tests used to create it gave no indication of statistical significance and 
could not be used to either support or reject my hypotheses. This is because the 
crosstabulations only shows the bivariate relationships, and not the actual effect of each 
independent variable relative to the others. 
Because of this I decided to move on to a more complex level of testing. I utilized 
ordinary least squares regression analysis to determine if these relationships remained 
significant when holding other variables constant. The specific data I collected from the 
regression tests included the standard coefficients which demonstrate the direction and 
strength of the relationship between each independent variable and dependent variable along 
with their significance levels. This data has been compiled into a second table below (Table 2).  
With this table, I was now able to make some conclusions about my hypothesis.  
Starting with H1: Conservative, white, men make are more likely to deny climate change 
than other demographic groups. This hypothesis was based on the characterization of 
conservative, white, men as the primary group of climate change deniers within the United 
States according to some previous research and ended up being only partially supported by my 









and race all remained significant determining factors of fear of climate change when accounting 
for all of the other independent variables. The negative sign in front of the coefficients for these 
three independent variables indicates an inverse relationship between them and the 
dependent variable. Based off of the coding of the data we can observe that conservative, 
Republican, and white individuals experience less fear towards climate change and their 
counterparts express greater levels of fear (Table 2). This pattern was first identified in Table 1 
when looking at the crosstab percentages, but now regression analysis has confirmed the 
significance of this relationship even while holding the effects of other independent variables 
constant, at the significance level of p<.01 (Table 2). 
While support was found within my data for the influence on pollical party, ideology, 
and race on climate change beliefs, the independent variables of gender and religiosity did not 
remain significant. The previously mentioned studies by Egan and Mullin found increased levels 
of denial among men in particular but this was not supported by the data presented here. The 
possible explanation for this could potentially be that more men or religious individuals 
subscribe to conservative political beliefs, which then ultimately becomes the determining 
factor in one’s fear of climate change. But gender and religion on their own do not influence 
one’s attitudes towards climate change. This is why I suggest that my first hypothesis was only 
partially supported.  
Moving on to my second hypothesis: Women are more likely to be fearful/distrusting of 
vaccinations than men. Referring back to Table 2 we can observe that the regression 
coefficients between the independent variable of gender and the three dependent variables 
asking about vaccinations all were significant at p< .01. According to the data, men were more 
likely to get the COVID-19 vaccine, less concerned about the safety of vaccines, and more likely 
believed that the benefits of vaccines outweighed the risks or their concerns (Table 2). We can 
conclude then that women experience the opposite of these relationships and are overall much 
more fearful and distrusting in the safety of vaccines. They are less likely to receive the COVID-
19 vaccine, more concerned about the general safety of them, and women were less likely to 
agree that the benefits of vaccinations outweigh the risks they perceive. Altogether this 
information and data fully supports my second hypothesis which was predicting that women 
are the main individuals who carry anti-intellectual beliefs about vaccinations.  
My third main hypothesis went as follows: Due to heightened polarization, political 
party affiliation is a significant predictor of anti-intellectual views. This hypothesis was definitely 
the broadest one and was based off of the previous research surrounding effects of party and 
elite polarization on climate change views. I wanted to expand this finding to all three 
categories of I was looking at including climate change, COVID-19, and vaccinations and I 
ultimately found support for this hypothesis in my data as well. Across all six dependent 
variables, the coefficients for political party were significant meaning that one’s political party 
was a significant predictor of their attitudes and beliefs no matter what topic they were asked 
about (Table 2). This supports the claims that party politicization does drive public opinion on 
these issues and also supports my third hypothesis. 
Not only this but looking at the first row of Table 2 you can also see that political 
ideology has a separate and independent effect from political party across all dependent 
variables as well. Just like party, the coefficients for the independent variable of ideology 
remained significant demonstrating their effectiveness in predicting public attitudes across all 
questions. This was very surprising to see because oftentimes political party and ideology are 
grouped together and seen as strongly correlated, but these findings suggest that there are 
distinct differences which allow each to be influential even when holding the other constant. 
Adding to on my initial hypothesis I can now say that both political party affiliation and political 
ideology are significant predictors of whether one holds anti-intellectual views towards these 
issues. 
My last hypothesis I considered to be a related hypothesis because I did not believe it 
would be the best indication of anti-intellectualism, instead it would be highlighting a justified 
fear. I predicted that people of color are more fearful of vaccinations due to the history of 
violence and abuse by our medical systems in the United States. While it does not deal with 
anti-intellectualism as explicitly, I believe it is still an important lens of analysis to apply to this 
work for not all experiences of individuals have been comparable and these disparities in 
treatment will likely manifest themselves in attitudes today. 
 Referring back to the regression table and looking at the fifth row of the race 
independent variable, the coefficients under the three questions pertaining to vaccinations 
were all significant. The numbers show us that white people are more likely to get the COVID-
19 vaccine compared to other races, are less worried about the safety concerns of vaccinations, 
and more likely to believe their benefits outweigh their risks (Table 2). From this relationship 
we can once again conclude that people of color experience the opposite attitudes of white 
people. This relationship is also reflected in the Table 1 which provides percentages specifically 
for Black Americans who expressed the highest level of concern out of all demographic 
categories for the safety of vaccines in general. The regression analysis then proved this pattern 
was significant and upheld my fourth hypothesis. 
What my fourth hypothesis highlights is the fact that anti-intellectual views can be 
informed by very different things for different people. In the case of people of color in America 
their fear and distrust in the safety of scientifically backed practices like vaccinations is 
cultivated by generational trauma, while white Americans have not experienced the same 
systemic violence from medical institutions and practitioners. This study’s goal was to look 
specifically into the political social correlates that inform anti-intellectual and denialist beliefs 
towards climate change, COVID-19, and vaccinations and has successfully demonstrated how 
these two things interact, but the next logical step from here would be to do a deeper dive into 
how these individuals come to hold these views. Several areas of particular interest that have 
been discussed in related literature pieces include social media use, news exposure, and 
education to name a few. Further research into how specific demographic groups are impacted 
by these factors may help paint a more holistic picture of anti-intellectualism in the U.S. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, using my recoded data from the Survey on American Fears I have found 
full support for three out of four of my hypotheses H2, H3, and H4. I have demonstrated that 
women and people of color are more likely to be distrusting and fearful of vaccination practices 
both in general and surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, I have also shown how 
political parties and ideologies are the most influential factors in determining whether someone 
holds anti-intellectual views and act independently from one another despite their similarities. 
While I did not find full support for my first hypothesis, I was able to conclude that political 
party, ideology, and race are all significant predictors of whether someone is fearful of climate 
change. Specifically, conservative and white individuals are the least likely demographic 
categories to fear it. Overall, understanding which portions of the American public carry anti-
intellectual beliefs is a vital first step in addressing the problem of this sentiment. The policy 
areas discussed are all strongly related to public health we cannot properly respond to crisis 
without public support and incentive. In order to ensure future safety for all Americans we 
need effective policy responses backed by the expertise of scientific efforts and this starts by 
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